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The Temporary Marketing Organization 
 
 
Abstract 
Increasingly, marketing activity is carried out within temporary organizations, where teams are 
assembled to complete a specific task within a predetermined timeframe. Such organizations are 
uniquely suited to promoting various marketing outcomes but are not well understood. From a 
practical standpoint, their inherent characteristics create organizational challenges which, if not 
appropriately managed, can compromise performance. Drawing on agency theory and research 
on embedded ties, we conceptualize these challenges in terms of particular selection and 
enforcement problems. We identify three different forms of temporary marketing organizations 
that vary in their selection and enforcement qualities. Next, we develop a conceptual framework 
which shows the selection and enforcement implications of a temporary organization’s task, 
timeline and team composition. We also show how selection and enforcement mechanisms have 
portable qualities and can be “imported” to a given temporary organization, either from a prior 
temporary organization or from a larger permanent one.  
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Marketing decisions and outcomes, for instance those relating to new product 
development, service delivery, and marketing communications, depend crucially on their 
organizational context. Past research has considered such decisions and outcomes within two 
main organizational contexts: (1) permanent firms (Day 1994; Ghosh and John 2005; Moorman 
and Day 2016), and (2) ongoing long-term relationships between firms (Dwyer et al. 1987; Jap 
and Ganesan 2000). Increasingly, however, marketing activity is being carried out within the 
context of temporary organizations, where the focal parties don’t necessarily share a permanent 
structure or a long-term association. Temporary organizations are widespread in new product 
development (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995; Ibert 2004), business-to-business marketing (Tuli et 
al. 2007), and supply chain and channel design (Pfohl and Buse 2000). They are also increasingly 
popular in advertising, where campaign delivery requires the collaboration of diversely skilled 
specialists (Grabher 2002), and in the delivery of complex services like health care and tourism 
(Tax et al. 2013).  
Industry observers have predicted that temporary organizations will be increasingly 
prevalent in meeting marketing objectives, given the pressure on firms to deliver innovative 
outcomes while simultaneously containing costs by outsourcing to external parties (Grabher 
2004). New product development in the pharmaceutical industry, for example, has been all but 
devolved to temporary coalitions of universities, private labs, research centers, and IT firms, such 
that between 2000 and 2011, more than half of all new drugs approved in the United States were 
developed in “stand-alone entities” organized around particular drug discovery and 
commercialization (Myshko 2014). Resorting to temporary organizations can promote  
organizational agility which is, according to a 2017 McKinsey Global Survey, among the top-
three priorities of business leaders (Ahlbäck et al. 2017).  
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Yet, despite their apparent attractiveness, temporary organizations pose significant 
challenges, many of which are not readily accounted for by standard theory (Child and McGrath 
2001). As a category, temporary organizations – described by some as the “organizational analog 
of a one-night stand” (Meyerson et al. 1996, p. 167) – are known for the “high variance” in their 
outcomes (Faulkner and Anderson 1987, p. 884). Some temporary organizations create products, 
services, or experiences that impress industry experts and delight customers. Others, in contrast, 
exceed their budgets, fall short of expectations, and are soon forgotten. As an organizational 
form, temporary organizations have been argued to possess unusual “liability of newness” 
problems (Nohria 1992). For example, upon winning the global communications business for 
Dell in 2007, holding company WPP built a new marketing communications temporary 
organization, ‘Enfatico’, from the resources of its existing agencies primarily to provide a high 
level of service to Dell. While enthusiastically conceived, this initiative ultimately faced a 
number of challenges and was folded back into the Y&R agency two years later (Gralpois 2010).  
We posit that the inherent challenges of temporary organizations, which contribute to 
their high variance property, follow from their discrete time dimension: namely, a lack of a 
distinct past and a future. With respect to the past, the outcome of a temporary organization 
hinges on the characteristics of its “motley crew” of members (Caves 2000, p. 5); many of whom 
may be working together for the very first time. From an organizational standpoint, this makes 
team selection a crucial undertaking; even more so than in other settings. Further, the outcome of 
a temporary organization’s task depends on its members’ efforts. Yet, in absence of a tangible 
future – many temporary organizations disband upon task completion – the inherent incentives 
for inducing member effort that characterize other organizational forms (Heide and Miner 1992) 
are lacking. In addition, for many temporary organizations standard mechanisms like member 
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socialization (Chatman 1991) and long-term rewards (Holmstrom and Tirole 1989) are 
unavailable. As a consequence, temporary organizations face significant enforcement problems.  
We develop a conceptual framework based on three forms of temporary organizations 
which differ in their selection and enforcement properties. Theoretically, the framework rests in 
part on the notion of portability (Groysberg et al. 2008), namely the idea that particular selection 
and enforcement mechanisms can be transferred from a given temporary organization’s context, 
and thus be supplied (exogenously) to the temporary organization in question. For instance, a 
“hybrid” temporary organization (Schwab and Miner 2008) can draw on organizational qualities 
that reside in prior ties among its members, while a “fully embedded” temporary organization 
benefits from the properties of the permanent organization within which it exists and which can 
be brought to bear on discrete tasks. Grabher’s (2002) analysis of the UK advertising industry 
shows how temporary organizations are embedded in “organizational and social layers” (p. 243). 
One of our key theoretical arguments is that if a given temporary organization, due such “layers”, 
benefits from portable selection and enforcement benefits, it reduces the need for task-specific 
selection and enforcement efforts.   
We seek to make four contributions to the literature. First, we document the unique 
characteristics and performance outcomes of an organizational form that is increasingly important 
to marketing. Given that marketing capabilities have a greater impact on firm performance than 
operational and R&D capabilities (e.g., Krasnikov and Jayachandran 2008), there will be a 
premium on effective management of temporary marketing organizations. At the same time, this 
research also shows that marketing knowledge is inherently difficult to codify. This problem, we 
argue, is magnified in a temporary marketing organization. Unfortunately, as shown by recent 
reviews (e.g.,Lundin et al. 2015), the current knowledge about temporary organizations is both 
limited, and represented almost exclusively by scholars in engineering, organization theory, and 
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general management. To date, marketing has contributed little. The current paper represents an 
initial attempt to join and inform this literature.  
Second, we identify some of the specific selection and enforcement mechanisms available 
to temporary organizations. Organizational researchers (e.g., Bakker et al. 2016; Lundin et al. 
2015) have commented on how insights into specific mechanisms are lacking in the literature, 
and on the tendency to view temporary organizations strictly as “tools” rather than as 
organizations in their own right (Packendorff 1995). As such, while our main focus is on 
temporary organizations in a marketing context, we believe that our conceptual discussion of 
selection and enforcement informs the general literature on temporary organizations.  
Third, we integrate economic and sociological perspectives on temporary marketing 
organizations. Our model draws on agency theory (Bergen et al. 1992) and extant research on 
“embedded” ties (Granovetter 2005; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001; Wuyts and Geyskens 2005) 
to suggest how a temporary marketing organization’s selection and enforcement problems can be 
addressed. Both of these theories are uniquely suited to analyzing temporary marketing 
organizations, given their focus on mechanisms such as signals which don’t involve permanent 
structures. We argue that the very logic of a temporary organization involves identifying inherent 
matches between members and tasks, rather than creating them through permanent structures. 
These theories, however, provide different perspectives on how matches come about, including 
the specific manners in which selection and enforcement take place.  
Fourth, from a practical standpoint we propose a conceptual framework which suggests 
how particular exogenous drivers, namely a temporary organization’s task characteristics, time 
frame, and team composition, give rise to (1) particular selection and enforcement needs, and 
ultimately (2) choices among types of temporary organizations. We also show how project 
managers and firms choose between making organization-specific governance choices vs.  
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relying on pre-existing mechanisms that are portable from prior temporary organizations. We 
suggest how matches between exogenous drivers and organizational choices have performance 
implications, with regard to (1) the creativity of a temporary organization’s output and (2) its 
decision-making speed. We illustrate our guidelines by drawing on examples from current 
practice.  
In the next section, we discuss the nature of the temporary marketing organization, and 
identify the main forms that exist. Next, we introduce our conceptual framework. The final 
section summarizes the model, discusses managerial implications and provides critical paths for 
future research. 
The Nature of the Temporary Marketing Organization 
Based on the original contributions of Bennis (1965) and Goodman and Goodman (1976), a 
temporary organization is generally defined as a “temporally bounded group of interdependent 
actors formed to perform a complex task” (Burke and Morley 2016, p. 1237). “Temporally 
bounded” means that a temporary organization is initiated by the commitment to a certain task, 
and terminated by its completion; by the attainment of a particular state, or by reaching a 
predetermined timeline (Grabher 2002; Manning and Sydow 2011). In other words, a temporary 
organization is subject to “institutionalized termination” (Lundin and Söderholm 1995, p. 449) 
rendering it effectively “disposable” (March 1995, p. 427). The temporary organization members 
are individuals who collectively possess the skills and resources required to carry out the focal 
task. In agency-theoretic terms (e.g., Bergen et al. 1992; Turner and Müller 2003) these are 
“agents” who are assembled and managed by a “principal”, namely the temporary organization’s 
project manager. The principal could be the chief technology officer on an application 
development initiative, the chief marketing officer managing software developers and advertising 
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agencies for the launch of a new brand, or a firm’s CEO or CMO as they assemble a temporary 
organization within or outside the boundaries of their permanent organization. As shown by Tax, 
McCutcheon, and Wilkinson (2013), a customer may also serve as a temporary marketing 
organization’s principal, by virtue of playing the role of a “resource integrator” (Vargo and Lusch 
2008, p. 257) who assembles a team of service providers for a given task.1  
The ‘Stand-Alone’ Temporary Organization 
A “baseline” temporary organization has a discrete time horizon, and possesses neither a 
past nor a future. Indeed, the notion of discreteness, which in the extant literature (e.g., Schwab 
and Miner 2008) is sometimes captured by the term “stand-alone”, is the “constitutive property” 
of a temporary organization (Sydow 2017, p. 200). Baseline “stand-alone” temporary 
organizations are quite common, for instance in advertising (Grabher 2002), high-technology 
systems selling (Möller and Rajala 1999), and supply chain design (Pfohl and Buse 2000).  
In Table 1, we compare a stand-alone temporary organization to three other, more 
commonly discussed, organizational forms: namely, a joint venture, a start-up, and a permanent 
organization.2 A distinctive feature of a stand-alone temporary organization is a complete absence 
of both (1) a history of interaction between members, and (2) a possible future. At the other 
extreme, due to the employment relationship and ownership of internal divisions, a permanent 
                                                 
1 Temporary organizations may exist that don’t exhibit a standard hierarchical structure between a principal and an 
agent, or that exhibit more complex structures, such as multiple agency hierarchies. For instance, a temporary 
organization’s manager may also be an agent vis-à-vis its owner (e.g., a financial investor), who then acts as 
principal (Turner and Müller 2003). The principal-agent relationship within a temporary organization may also shift 
over time. Thus, the agency partner who initially assembles a temporary organization under the impetus of the CMO 
of her client organization may delegate its management to one or several senior team members, who may take turns 
leading it at various stages. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to such situations.  
2 In order to streamline the flow of our argument and to ensure comparability in our discussion, Table 1 only features 
the “baseline” case for each of these alternative organizational forms. We also appreciate that our comparative 
organizational forms in Table 1 are not exhaustive and that partnerships and alliances (i.e., organizational forms not 
involving long-term contracts and equity participation) share similarities with temporary organizations. Typically, 
however, alliance and partnership research focuses on a “formal agreement between two partners” (emphasis added, 
Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011, p. 1117), while temporary organizations are concerned with agreements 
between multiple members. 
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organization can rely on both a history and the promise of future interaction between members on 
multiple tasks. Joint ventures and start-ups occupy the middle ground between temporary and 
permanent organizations, and share certain features of each. For example, both joint ventures and 
start-ups are less enduring than permanent organizations, despite the general expectation of a 
future, as they are more prone to failure and premature termination (Gulati 1998). Start-ups also 
share with temporary organizations the absence of a history due, in part, to the novel tasks and 
market needs that bring together a unique group of organizational members. Neither joint 
ventures nor start-ups, however, exhibit the absence of both a past and a future. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Consider next the specific organizational implications of a ‘stand-alone’ temporary 
organization. As noted, the members of such an organization have no history of previous 
interactions – they are true “interdependent strangers” (Meyerson et al. 1996, p. 169) who lack a 
collective memory (Orr 2014). This, in turn, implies a lack of first-hand information about 
potential members’ attributes, and creates a need for explicit selection efforts on behalf of the 
organization’s principal, who needs to identify, sometimes from scratch, the particular skills and 
knowledge bases required by the agents to complete the focal task. As an example, Tax et al. 
(2013) note the importance of systematic selection in the delivery of complex services, where 
customers expect “connected experiences” and coordinated efforts from teams of suppliers or 
agents. Frequently the focal agent skills are unobservable or associated with information 
asymmetry; a condition which opportunistic agents can purposely exploit, thus creating an 
adverse selection problem (Akerlof 1970; Flyvbjerg 2011).3 
                                                 
3 Selection may also involve the interactions between the agents in question. Caves (2003) frames this question as 
the “O-Ring” property of temporary organizations, where each input must perform up to a certain level. Creating the 
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Agency theory’s account of selection involves a principal who creates opportunities for 
agent self-selection (Bergen et al. 1992; Spence 1973), and/or agents who send signals that serve 
as proxies for their underlying characteristics. These signals may involve costs to the agent which 
create a separating equilibrium, in that only “appropriate” agents have the incentive to post the 
required “bond” (Ippolito 1990). In general, the selection process in agency theory is task-
specific and forward-looking: it focuses on the unique selection efforts that are needed for the 
task at hand. This perspective is of particular relevance to a stand-alone temporary organization, 
which does not possess inherent or pre-existing organizational properties. 
While selection efforts serve important organizational purposes, they are rarely sufficient 
on their own, in part because even the “right” agents may fail to fully use their skills (Kirmani 
and Rao 2000; Mishra et al. 1998). As such, explicit enforcement efforts are typically needed to 
mitigate ongoing moral hazard problems (Arrow 1985). A stand-alone temporary organization 
faces unique enforcement problems due to its discrete time horizon (Cattani and Ferriani 2008; 
Manning and Sydow 2011) which generates weak incentives for cooperation among its members 
(Axelrod 1984; Heide and Miner 1992).4 Consider, as an example, the stand-alone temporary 
product development organization created to build the True Story card game and mobile app. Its 
instigators followed strict parameters for involvement using artificial intelligence on the Foundry 
online platform to assemble freelancers, and communicated through messaging software. The 
True Story members “flash mobbed” solely to create the product, and promptly disbanded after 
the completion of this task (Scheiber 2017). The “shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984; Heide 
                                                 
right matches and ensuring their continuation pose interesting problems in their own right (Chisholm 1997; 
Daskalaki 2010). However, analyzing them goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
4 Clearly, there is often a desire to continue a collaboration initiated by a temporary organization. Research shows, 
however, that continuity is contingent on various factors, including the focal organization’s performance (Schwab 
and Miner 2008). Thus, a temporary organization has an uncertain future.  
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and Miner 1992) was so remote in this case that the project leader even described fellow 
temporary organization members as “these faceless, nameless, nationless submitters” (Kessler 
2017, para 18). 
The lack of built-in enforcement mechanisms requires explicit or task-specific efforts. In 
agency theory, this involves a formal contract which specifies financial incentives and monitoring 
procedures (Jacobides and Croson 2001). A temporary organization poses unique challenges in 
this regard, because of the need to provide incentives in the presence of novel tasks and 
ambiguity with regard to individual agent contributions (Azoulay and Lerner 2013; Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1989). For instance, temporary organizations developing new products in the 
commercial aircraft industry (Shenhar et al. 2016) often use explicit revenue-sharing contracts 
which are designed to align the parties’ interests.  
Hybrids and Fully Embedded Temporary Organizations: The Role of Context  
While a stand-alone temporary organization constitutes a useful baseline, research and 
empirical observation also point to other forms. Table 2 draws on Schwab and Miner (2008) to 
compare a stand-alone temporary organization to two other forms with respect to their past and 
future dimensions. The first line of the table shows a baseline stand-alone temporary 
organization. Next, we suggest how a temporary organization may “acquire” a past or a future, by 
virtue of (1) capitalizing on its members’ prior relationships (a “hybrid” temporary organization), 
or (2) being embedded within a permanent organization where the focal members share a larger 
organizational context (a “fully embedded” temporary organization).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
In practice, a temporary organization’s contextual influences may serve organizational 
purposes, with regard to how selection and enforcement are carried out. However, the specific 
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nature of these influences, or, more generally, the manner in which temporary organizations 
interact with permanent structures (Sydow 2017), remains a largely unanswered question. In 
contrast to agency theory and its focus on individual transactions, embeddedness theory argues 
that economic transactions take place within social structures (Granovetter 1992) which allow for 
selection based on direct observation of past behavior. Specifically, embedded ties facilitate the 
transfer of fine-grained information (Uzzi 1997) which reveals parties’ larger identities 
(Granovetter 1992). These identities, in turn, may be relevant to a new temporary organization, 
and thus serve selection purposes.5  
Further, the social content of embedded ties gives them inherent enforcement qualities 
(Krippner and Alvarez 2007). An agent’s identity in an embedded relationship comprises more 
than skills and capabilities; it also includes solidarity with the other party (Durkheim 1933; Gulati 
and Gargiulo 1999) and thus helps to align the goals of the principal and agent (Ouchi 1980).6 
This larger identity, in turn, serves as an ongoing source of motivation and self-control (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2010). 
Consider first a “hybrid” temporary organization, where the parties have a history gained 
from interacting on previous tasks. Hybrid temporary organizations are common in feature film 
production, where the same parties often engage in repeated collaborations (Faulkner and 
Anderson 1987). A specific example of a hybrid is the constellation of firms and independent 
contractors involved with Boeing’s ongoing product development of the 737 airplane, first 
                                                 
5 This discussion points to one of the inherent challenges of a temporary organization: While a principal may have 
pre-existing agent relationships, the novelty of a temporary organization’s task may call for a broad search to identify 
new agents with the necessary skills and resources (Reagans et al. 2004). In essence, “strong” prior ties are 
inherently limited with regard to information access (Granovetter 1973). 
6 Temporary organizations have been shown to possess distinct norms and to exhibit patterns of collective behavior 
(Scheiber 2017). As such, despite their discrete time dimensions, they are distinct from pure market transactions 
defined by their lack of social content, as described in Macneil’s (1980, p. 12) famous example of “a purchase of 
unbranded gasoline, out-of-town, at an independent gas station, paid for with cash”. 
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launched in 1966 and since evolved over three generations, including nine major variants. A 
supplier’s involvement in previous product development phases of the 737 would create a 
reasonable expectation of being selected for involvement in subsequent phases. In general, 
ongoing relationships between the same parties represent a source of stability (Taylor and Levitt 
2007). More specifically, as shown in Table 2, past interactions have organizational implications 
due to direct observation of a partner’s behavior, and to the presence of relationship-level 
reputations and dyad-level norms which can be brought to bear on a new temporary organization.  
Starkey et al. (2000, p. 299) have described a hybrid temporary organization as a “latent 
organization”, because of the parties’ ability to activate prior relationships (Lundin et al. 2015). 
At the same time, just like their counterparts in a stand-alone temporary organization, the 
members of a hybrid temporary organization don’t necessarily expect to cooperate again after 
task completion. For instance, with more radical innovation in the Boeing product line (e.g., the 
787 Dreamliner), members are far less certain of being involved in future product development 
tasks (Shenhar et al. 2016). 
The third form is a “fully embedded” temporary organization, which exists within the 
boundaries of the permanent organization to which its members belong (Bakker et al. 2016). This 
form of temporary organization may possess some of the dyadic properties of a hybrid, to the 
extent that the same parties may be involved in successive temporary organizations. A fully 
embedded temporary organization also benefits from the aggregate features of the permanent 
organization itself, including organizational-level reputations and norms. As will be discussed, 
these features have particular selection benefits. Moreover, by virtue of being part of a permanent 
organization, a fully embedded temporary organization possesses a distinct future time horizon 
and a “probability of continuing association” (Demsetz 1988, p. 155). This time horizon provides 
enforcement benefits even in the absence of direct interactions between parties. Cremer (1986, p. 
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34), for instance, notes the disciplinary effects that “the perpetual presence of tomorrow” has on 
organizational members. Even if discrete temporary organizations are formed and dissolved on an 
ongoing basis, common ownership may influence their members' actions, by allowing them to 
project beyond the completion of a given task.  
These questions are the focus of recent research on the implications of the post-project 
“afterlife” for the principal-agent relationship (Ojansivu et al. 2013). Consider, for example,  
Ford Motor Company’s development of the 1992 Lincoln Continental (e.g., Roth and Kleiner 
2000). While organizing product development around temporary teams was becoming the norm 
in North American automotive manufacturing at the time, expectations of post-project interaction 
were limited by members’ strongly-held “assumptions of their job description” (Ayas and Zeniuk 
2001, p. 66) and narrow understanding of the product development process. Yet, in reality, 
members of the Lincoln team remained in contact even as they “were reassigned to other 
projects” (Ayas and Zeniuk 2001, p. 68).  
As shown in Table 2, in addition to its built-in future, a fully embedded temporary 
organization has a set of explicit enforcement mechanisms at its disposal (Che and Yoo 2001; 
Williamson 1975; Zenger 1994), including low-powered incentives (e.g., promotion 
opportunities, non-monetary rewards), and centralized authority and monitoring mechanisms 
(Coase 1937). Grant (1996) notes how low-powered incentives help promote cooperation among 
specialists; a common scenario within fully embedded temporary organizations. In the section 
below, we discuss how different selection and enforcement mechanisms match up with particular 
exogenous influences or drivers to impact a temporary organization’s performance.  
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A Conceptual Framework of the Temporary Marketing Organization 
Our conceptual framework is shown in Figure 1. We first introduce its main components 
and linkages. Next, we discuss some of its underlying micro-level processes, and develop a set of 
propositions. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The framework’s starting point is a series of “drivers” or exogenous influences which 
create governance problems of various kinds. We draw on past research on temporary 
organizations (Jacobsson et al. 2013; Lundin and Söderholm 1995) to focus on three specific 
manifestations of the so-called “Ts”, namely, task, time, and team. These are the novelty of the 
organization’s focal task, its planned duration, and the composition (or heterogeneity) of its 
team.7 As shown in Figure 1, the effects of the three exogenous drivers on the choice of 
temporary organization form are mediated by the particular selection and enforcement problems 
which they give rise to.  
Theoretically, these particular theoretical linkages assume that organizational form 
matters. In part, this is because, as discussed, organizational forms possess inherent governance 
mechanisms, such as the social fabric of a hybrid and the long-term rewards of a fully embedded 
temporary organization. As such, the need for a certain governance mechanism (e.g., a particular 
enforcement mechanism) impacts the choice of organizational form.  
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that this is not an exhaustive set of drivers. Jacobsson et al. (2013), for instance, discuss a fourth 
“t”; namely, transition. Transition, however, has more to do with the transformation that takes place during the 
lifespan of a temporary organization (e.g., from idea to full-fledged marketed product and from temporary structure 
to becoming embedded within a permanent organization) than with an exogenous driver per se. We also note that the 
drivers may be related among themselves. For instance, the nature of a temporary organization’s task may determine 
the composition of its team. We will show, however, that each driver poses unique governance challenges. 
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Further, as shown by the backward-pointing arrow in the figure, we allow for the 
possibility that context matters, and that an existing temporary organization, either in the form of 
a hybrid or a fully embedded one, may make certain selection and enforcement benefits available 
to a new one. Under such a scenario, pre-existing governance mechanisms are portable across 
organizational contexts, and can be brought to bear on a new temporary organization.  
The last part of the conceptual framework describes a temporary organization’s 
performance outcomes. We capture performance outcomes through output creativity and 
decision-making speed. Our general expectation, as expressed by the dotted line which frames the 
model in Figure 1, is that performance follows from matches between (1) the exogenous drivers 
and (2) the organizational choices made. Conversely, as will be discussed, we expect that 
mismatches will undermine performance.   
Drivers, Governance Mechanisms, and the Choice of Temporary Organization Form 
Task. A temporary organization’s task has been argued to represent its “reason for being” 
(Lundin and Söderholm 1995). Our particular focus is on novel tasks, where a temporary 
organization is assembled for the purpose of executing a “one-off, non-routine” task (Gann and 
Salter 2000). Such initiatives are characterized by causal ambiguity (Thompson 1967), in that the 
principal does not clearly define the goals nor the means to reach them at the outset (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991; Lenfle and Loch 2010). For instance, x, a highly confidential R&D facility 
founded in 2010, allows its parent company Alphabet to assemble temporary organizations 
dedicated to developing “moonshot” new products with no direct link to Google’s core business 
of internet search. They include energy kites, salt-based energy storage and floating internet 
routers (https://x.company/, accessed 4 October 2018).  
Truly novel tasks require distinctly novel human and technological resources that may not 
be available from prior relationships or within an existing firm, and therefore call for the 
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principal to search from a new agent pool. Levitt et al. (1999) specifically describe how non-
routine activities tend to involve individuals (for instance, advertising agents or marketing 
consultants) who lack experience working together, even though they may share common 
industry or disciplinary knowledge.  
For the above reasons, we expect task novelty to be best addressed by a stand-alone 
temporary organization, albeit subject to organization-specific selection and enforcement efforts 
which safeguard against subsequent difficulties. In the case of True Story, the careful algorithm-
based selection of contributors, and the clear specification of their roles in the development of the 
game, contributed to mitigating such difficulties and enabled them to discharge their 
responsibilities effectively. However, when the unique nature of the task led to some substandard 
deliverables, the principal intervened to solve the problem by hiring “another freelancer ... to 
oversee this work” (Scheiber 2017, p. 4).  
We expect hybrid and fully embedded temporary organizations to be more constrained 
vis-à-vis novel tasks, because both involve selection from a pre-existing, and thus limited, pool of 
agents. Familiar tasks, however, create a different scenario: For such tasks, “members know what 
to do, and why and by whom it should be done” (Lundin and Söderholm 1995, p. 441). Agent 
requirements can be unambiguously spelled out ex ante in a way that facilitates selection, and 
enforcement can be carried out through standard agency devices like monitoring, potentially 
against the backdrop of a formal contract (Grossman and Hart 1983). Agents’ general industry 
roles and reputations may also serve monitoring purposes (Bechky 2006; Turner and Müller 
2003). Thus, for familiar tasks the relatively modest selection and enforcement requirements 
make a hybrid or fully embedded temporary organization feasible. We propose the following:  
Proposition 1: The greater the novelty of the task, the greater the need for organization-
specific selection and enforcement mechanisms, and the higher the 
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likelihood of using a stand-alone temporary organization relative to 
hybrid and fully embedded forms. 
 
Time. Time is a second critical driver of a temporary organization’s governance needs 
(Lundin and Söderholm 1995). Importantly, while all temporary organizations share the 
characteristics of a fixed start and ending point, their planned duration varies considerably. We 
focus on differences in duration and their governance implications. Specifically, time limits 
create a sense of urgency and place a premium on selecting appropriate partners and quickly 
deploying enforcement mechanisms. For instance, creating a music video takes as little as two 
days (Bechky 2006). Such a time frame makes it virtually impossible to craft organization-
specific enforcement mechanisms like social norms, and it may be necessary for the principal to 
draw on an existing network where agents’ reputations from direct interactions (1) serve 
informational and enforcement purposes and thus (2) represent  functional substitutes for new or 
organization-specific mechanisms.  
Arguably, the need for speed provides an incentive to search for agents internally, and 
thus to resort to a fully embedded temporary organization. Doing so, however, may come at the 
expense of (1) acquiring truly new knowledge [as per Granovetter’s (1973) tie strength thesis], 
and (2) identifying partners with skills that match the focal task. In essence, embedded ties from 
prior direct interactions – that is, the “shadow of the past” from previous exchanges – are better 
suited to provide portable selection and enforcement benefits that can be applied to a new task. 
Importantly, such benefits are not necessarily available from a fully embedded temporary 
organization where the focal parties, while belonging to a common permanent organization, may 
not have had direct prior interactions with each other.8  In proposition form: 
                                                 
8 We acknowledge that repeated ties may take place between members of the same permanent organization. If so, the 
temporary organization in question would be the equivalent of a hybrid, due to the direct (rather than indirect) 
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Proposition 2: The shorter the duration of the task, the lower the feasibility of crafting 
organization-specific selection and enforcement mechanisms, and the 
higher the likelihood of using a hybrid temporary organization relative to 
stand-alone and fully embedded forms. 
 
Team. A third driver of a temporary organization’s governance needs is its team 
composition (Lundin and Söderholm 1995) conceived, in our context, as the heterogeneity of its 
members. Heterogeneity presents a number of organizational challenges, perhaps the most 
important of which being the need to coordinate action and manage potential conflict (Gulati et 
al. 2012). In these respects, we expect the fully embedded form of temporary organization to 
possess inherent benefits relative to the stand-alone and hybrid forms.  
The high-powered incentives that characterize the stand-alone and hybrid forms serve to 
emphasise and “separate the interests of the agents” which may exacerbate underlying conflict 
within the temporary organization. The implicit and low-powered incentives characteristic of 
fully embedded temporary organizations, by contrast, serve to “interlock the fates of agents” via 
the employment relationship and, thus, reduce potential sources of conflict within the temporary 
organization (Che and Yoo 2001, p. 538). Further, an employment relationship gives rise to 
member expectations of mobility within and between teams within the permanent organization 
(Dougherty and Takacs 2004). Thus, in the event of potential conflict arising from heterogeneity, 
the principal can substitute and redeploy temporary organization members efficiently. In practice, 
the inherent characteristics of a fully embedded temporary organization possess unique selection 
and enforcement benefits that address the problems that arise from team heterogeneity. 
Proposition 3: The greater the heterogeneity of the team, the greater the need for 
enforcement through low-powered incentives, and the higher the 
likelihood of using a fully embedded temporary organization relative to 
hybrid and stand-alone forms.  
                                                 
association between the relevant parties. We note, however, that there are qualitative differences between internal 
and external transactions (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). We return to this question in the Discussion section. 
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Portability and Exogenous Selection and Enforcement Effects 
As discussed, our framework is based in part on the possibility that the selection and 
enforcement needs of a temporary organization may be portable or supplied exogenously, either 
from pre-existing agent relationships (in the case of a hybrid temporary organization), or from the 
features of a permanent organization (in the case of a fully embedded one). Albeit not entirely 
infeasible, portability is much less achievable in the case of a stand-alone temporary organization, 
which benefits neither from prior agent relationships nor a common permanent organization. 
Consider first the case of a hybrid. Past research has identified patterns of repeat 
encounters across temporary organizations through “persistent semi-permanent work groups” 
(Blair et al. 2001). Such interactions reduce information asymmetry due to (1) first-hand 
observation of agent attributes (Gulati et al. 2009), and (2) knowledge sharing between members 
about agent abilities (Grant 1996). As such, prior relationships serve potentially important 
selection purposes. With regard to enforcement, a pre-existing tie is capable of aligning parties’ 
goals (Ouchi 1980), which in turn promotes agent effort and reduces the need for explicit 
incentives and monitoring. For example, for the development of subsequent generations of the 
737 airplanes, Boeing, “reluctant to upset the delicate balance”, have tended to draw on familiar 
components suppliers for model upgrades, a fact made possible by a high percentage of 
immutable and familiar features of the 737 product (Aaronson et al. 2016, p. 4). This suggests 
that enforcement benefits may also be portable. 
As noted, hybrid temporary organizations represent sources of knowledge (Grant 1996), 
pertaining specifically to an individual agent and her capabilities (Krasnikov and Jayachandran 
2008) and motivation. Importantly, however, there are limits to the transferability of such 
knowledge. Stated differently, the portability that resides in prior relationships is subject to 
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boundary conditions. As we discuss below, these boundary conditions reside in the temporary 
organization’s task.  
Consider first selection, and how novel tasks limit portability. As an example, consider 
how many established firms are experimenting with temporary innovation labs to leapfrog (or, at 
the very least, keep pace with) industry upstarts in order to cope with faster innovation cycles and 
the threat of business model disruption (Davies and Hobday 2005; Grabher 2004). The example 
of X, noted earlier, provides an illustration of such experimentation, as does Spanish 
telecommunications company Telefonica, which set up a temporary innovation lab in Cambridge, 
UK, to work on the development of new products for Internet-of-Things (IoT) and wearable 
devices. The lab sat outside regular technology management and compliance processes at 
Telefonica but drew on established networks of agents, including Spanish engineers and long-
time partner MediaTek – a Taiwanese semiconductor design company – which housed the lab in 
its R&D offices. 
 A principal’s past interactions with individual agents reveal particular agent traits. 
However, given a new task these traits are not automatically portable (Huckman and Pisano 
2006). Past interactions may have demonstrated “technically competent role performance” 
(Meyerson et al. 1996), but it’s not a given that such information transfers readily to a new 
temporary organization with unique requirements (Schwab and Miner 2008). Theoretically, we 
posit that embedded ties are limited in their ability to address adverse selection problems which 
arise with new tasks. Grabher (2002) specifically discusses how some temporary organizations 
face significant selection problems because of the limited signaling value of general governance 
mechanisms like industry certification and professional codes.  
At the margin, a pre-existing tie may increase an agent’s tendency to truthfully represent 
her attributes to the principal, but this in itself may have a limited effect on a temporary 
22 
 
marketing organization’s performance. In practice, this means that for selection purposes in the 
context of novel tasks, the information that is naturally available to a hybrid must be augmented 
with explicit (endogenous) signals that reveal the necessary agent traits. At very high levels of 
novelty, the advantages of portability might diminish to the point that it makes more sense for the 
firm to abandon a hybrid approach, reverting to a stand-alone model of temporary organization 
and benefiting from searching a completely new, and larger, pool of agents.9  
As a specific example, Boeing, in the development of the radically different 787 
Dreamliner, had to adopt a new organizational model to recruit a large number of new and 
existing partners who were responsible for an “unprecedented portion of the design” (Shenhar et 
al. 2016, p. 63) – design skills that Boeing lacked due to the inclusion of new technologies that 
had not been used before in such large civilian aircraft. This required the development of specific 
incentives deployed (endogenously) for the new product development organization. In particular, 
Boeing asked its suppliers to self-select for a “build-to-performance” risk and revenue sharing 
model unique to the Dreamliner development task, in which suppliers bore the upfront cost of 
R&D but shared in revenues from future aircraft sales. Thus, we suggest that hybrid (embedded) 
ties and formal (agency-based) signals are not functional substitutes for each other. Rather, they 
address different types of problems, and may serve complementary purposes. In proposition 
form: 
Proposition 4: The greater the novelty of the task, the lower the portability of the 
selection benefits from a hybrid temporary organization, and the greater 
the need for organization-specific selection mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
9 The reversion to a stand-alone form at high levels of novelty, and the selection and enforcement efforts this form 
requires, is captured in Proposition 1.  
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A pre-existing tie with a particular principal also impacts an agent’s general motivation to 
support the focal relationship (Uzzi 1997). As such, we posit that the enforcement properties of a 
hybrid tie (Krippner and Alvarez 2007) are portable across temporary marketing organizations, 
regardless of the nature of the task. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, the enforcement effect of a 
hybrid tie has a broader scope than its selection effect, and inferences about likely agent effort 
transfer more readily across individual temporary organizations. In practice, to the extent that a 
hybrid tie has portable enforcement qualities, it serves as a functional substitute for formal 
agency mechanisms like financial incentives and monitoring. Corts and Singh’s (2004) research 
specifically suggests that repeated interaction between parties is capable of solving incentive 
problems. In formal terms, while hybrid ties possess limitations vis-a-vis adverse selection 
problems, they may, because of their general effects on agent motivation, serve as solutions to 
moral hazard problems. We propose the following: 
Proposition 5: For a hybrid temporary organization, enforcement benefits are portable 
regardless of the nature of the task. 
 
Finally, consider portability in the context of a fully embedded temporary organization. 
Here, the features of a permanent organization confer potentially portable selection and 
enforcement benefits to the temporary organization. As with hybrids, we expect portability to be 
task-dependent: For familiar tasks, we expect that a fully embedded temporary organization’s 
selection and enforcement benefits will both be portable. For novel tasks, however, we expect 
only the enforcement benefits to be portable.  
Importantly, while our expectations for hybrids and fully embedded temporary 
organizations parallel each other, the underlying explanatory mechanisms (and the specific 
sources of portability) are different. In the case of a hybrid temporary organization, the portable 
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selection benefits (for familiar tasks) rest on direct interaction and personal reputations between 
principals and agents. These, in turn, make information about a partner’s motivation to perform 
available from personal experience. This defining feature of a hybrid temporary organization is 
not necessarily present in a fully embedded temporary organization, where the parties, while 
belonging to the same permanent organization, may not necessarily have interacted directly in the 
past.  
As a result, the selection benefits for a fully embedded temporary organization involve 
general agent reputations that reflect a firm’s standard “experience ratings” (Williamson 1975), 
but which may not be based on direct interactions between the focal parties. Further, the portable 
enforcement benefits of a hybrid are rooted in particular dyadic norms cultivated from direct 
contact between parties. While a fully embedded temporary organization possesses unique 
enforcement mechanisms like low-powered incentives (e.g., in the form of promotion 
opportunities and fixed financial compensation) that serve enforcement purposes (Grant 1996), 
we believe that these mechanisms, due to their general and non-personal nature, are weaker than 
the dyadic norms that characterize a hybrid. Team members working in the Lincoln Continental 
(fully embedded) temporary organization, for example, contributed to a series of “process 
innovations” and built “communities of practice” that united them under a common mission 
(Ayas and Zeniuk 2001, p. 67). While highly attractive organizational features, they were less 
likely to survive the disbanding of the temporary organization as the “immune system of the 
larger company” made it more difficult for learning to permeate beyond the team at project 
completion (Ayas and Zeniuk 2001, p. 67). Accordingly, we propose the following: 
 Proposition 6: The portability of a fully embedded temporary organization’s selection 
and enforcement benefits is weaker than for those of a hybrid.  
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Performance Outcomes of the Temporary Marketing Organization  
Our first six propositions are descriptive in nature, in that they illustrate the likely (as per 
extant theory) organizational choices made by firms. We note, however, that the theories that we 
relied on to derive Propositions 1 to 3 (e.g., agency theory) have explicit normative 
underpinnings. As such, organizational choices that are consistent with these propositions 
represent “matches” that should manifest themselves on specific performance dimensions – 
including, as per the extant literature (e.g., Levitt et al. 1999; Shenhar 2001), a temporary 
organization’s impact on the end customer. Such impact may include output creativity, as 
reflected in whether a temporary organization’s output, for instance a new advertising campaign 
or product, differs from competing alternatives in a way that is meaningful to customers (Dewar 
and Dutton 1986). Further, a match may impact decision-making speed, or the time elapsed 
between the initial idea generation and the deployment of the focal campaign or product launch. 
In the following we explore how matches between the nature of a temporary organization’s task 
and its selection and enforcement requirements affect output creativity and decision-making 
speed, respectively – two outcomes that are particularly relevant to marketing.10   
Output creativity, we argue, is inherently linked with selection efforts. To the extent that a 
given selection process succeeds in identifying a “motley crew” (Caves 2000) of agents with an 
appropriate set of skills (a “match” scenario), it should produce an output with novel attributes, 
such as a new product or service that achieves a desired location in some multi-attribute space 
(Ghosh and John 2012). Research shows, for instance, that groups in which experienced members 
are appropriately matched with new ones produce more innovative outcomes (Perretti and Negro 
                                                 
10 For space reasons, we limit ourselves to explicating the performance relationships (matches and mismatches) that 
involve task characteristics (i.e., novelty). 
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2007). Thus, selection efforts that match the temporary organization’s novel task requirements 
can be expected to have performance implications in the form of output creativity.11 
Conversely, “mismatches”, or observed deviations from the stated propositions, can be 
expected to undermine performance. We consider two types of mismatches: First, a temporary 
organization’s actual selection and enforcement efforts may fall short of the requirements set 
forth in our framework for a required level of task novelty. Suppose, for instance, that a principal 
erroneously assumes that an existing agent relationship has complete portability and, based on 
that assumption, fails to undertake the explicit selection efforts that the new task requires. 
Theoretically, this would produce an adverse selection scenario (Akerlof 1970), in that agents 
who lack the necessary creative skills for the task are chosen. In practical terms, such an 
organization would be “underorganized” (Chen 2009) relative to the task at hand. Ultimately, 
output creativity would be compromised by the insufficient selection efforts. Davies and Hobday 
(2005) provide case evidence which suggest how customer-level outcomes like satisfaction may 
be undermined by mismatches between a temporary organization’s particular needs and the 
structures that are deployed to produce such outcomes. 
In the second type of mismatch, the organizational choices that are made in a given 
situation may produce a temporary organization that is “overorganized”, in that the mechanisms 
in question are redundant given the temporary organization’s actual needs. This could be a result 
of underestimating the organizational qualities that reside in a temporary organization’s larger 
context. For instance, unlike the logic underlying Proposition 1 that novel tasks require a stand-
alone temporary organization and new (task-appropriate) skills, a firm may fall back on an 
                                                 
11 This presumes that the relevant skills are actually deployed or applied to the focal task, in order to ensure the 
conversion (Chandy et al. 2006) from an initial idea or concept to an end product (e.g. a marketed product or a 
campaign).   
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existing structure and rely on a fully embedded temporary organization. For a truly novel task, 
this would involve a mismatch, to the extent that the necessary skills are unavailable internally. 
Ultimately, sought-after creativity outcomes may be compromised. The above discussion 
suggests the following proposition:  
Proposition 7: The closer the match between the novelty of a temporary marketing 
organization’s task and its selection efforts, the greater the creativity of its 
output. 
 
Proposition 7 will hold, in principle, for matched selection efforts across all forms of 
temporary marketing organizations. However, absolute levels of output creativity might differ 
across forms. In a stand-alone temporary marketing organization, information about member 
motivation is indirect, but the pool of potential candidate organizations is unlimited (in terms of 
ability). For a hybrid, on the other hand, information about motivation is more abundant and 
direct, yet the principal must draw from a limited agent pool (in terms of ability). Further, 
McDonald and Westphal (2003) identify the possibility of information-processing biases 
resulting from strong pre-existing ties (as in the case of a hybrid) which cause principals to settle 
for suboptimal agent relationships, revealed by a tendency to attach greater weight to 
collaborative rather than technical skills (Casciaro and Lobo 2005). Taken together, hybrid 
temporary marketing organizations will on balance produce less creative output than stand-alone 
temporary marketing organizations. 
Consider next the performance implications of decisions with regard to enforcement. 
Enforcement, we argue, is inherently linked with a temporary organization’s decision-making 
speed. As an example, in the context of new product development, speed is reflected in a given 
product’s time to market, as measured by the time elapsed between the initial idea stage of a 
product development process and the actual market launch (Fang 2008). In the context of 
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advertising, speed has to do with how quickly a campaign can be deployed that responds to key 
cultural events, political activities, or competitive actions (Grabher 2002). 
To the extent that appropriate enforcement efforts have successfully aligned parties’ 
objectives (e.g., through explicit incentives), the lower the friction in the organization’s decision-
making processes, and the more quickly the focal campaign or product can be launched. In 
general, aligning objectives helps develop blueprints for action (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995) 
which lead to efficiency by “preventing deviation” (Ulset 1996, p. 70). Where conflict does 
emerge between partners, it can be resolved quickly according to these predetermined protocols 
(Bstieler and Hemmert 2010) that increase decision-making speed. 
On the flip-side, mismatches are likely to undermine decision-making speed. If a firm 
relies on a stand-alone temporary organization under conditions of low task novelty, they will be 
wasting time searching for, and socializing, new organizational members when a deployment of 
internal staff would suffice. Further, the stand-alone temporary organization’s lack of built-in 
governance features will mean it is underorganized for the task at hand, which will reduce speed.  
Decision-making speed may be also compromised by relying on mechanisms that are not 
strictly needed given the nature of the task. Assume that a given principal chooses to rely on 
formal incentives and monitoring, as per agency theory. To the extent that a prior relationship (in 
the case of a hybrid) would have provided sufficient enforcement benefits, the overorganization 
represented by the new agency mechanisms imposes significant set-up costs for an enforcement 
regime that is ultimately redundant (Rowley et al. 2000). In fact, overorganization may have 
negative consequences in the form of agent reactance (Brehm 1966) which “crowds out” intrinsic 
motivation (Deci et al. 1999; Heide et al. 2007; John 1984). Given that temporary organizations 
often (1) involve tasks that require high levels of intrinsic motivation (Cattani and Ferriani 2008; 
Osterloh and Frey 2000), and/or (2) employ professional service providers (Greenwood and 
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Empson 2003; von Nordenflycht 2010) who value discretion and freedom from external 
constraints (Teece 2003), reactance scenarios are not unlikely and, thus, will significantly slow a 
temporary organization’s decision-making speed. Stated formally: 
Proposition 8: The closer the match between the novelty of a temporary marketing 
organization’s task and its enforcement efforts, the greater its decision-
making speed. 
 
Propositions 7 and 8 recognize the natural linkages between (1) selection efforts and 
output creativity and (2) enforcement efforts and decision-making speed. Yet, they leave 
somewhat open the possibility of other linkages, namely between (1) selection efforts and 
decision-making speed and (2) enforcement efforts and output creativity. Consider, for example, 
the latter case. Enforcement fulfils the purpose of aligning goals between temporary organization 
members and eliminating friction in the relationships between them. As per Proposition 8, these 
actions result in greater decision-making speed. It might be argued, however, that matched 
enforcement efforts – to the extent that they get everyone ‘on the same page’ – suppress output 
creativity by virtue of promoting homogeneity within the organization (Horwitz and Horwitz 
2007). 
 
Discussion 
Temporary organizations are increasingly used to carry out marketing activity. However, 
they tend to be “high variance” phenomena (Faulkner and Anderson 1987, p. 884) and their 
outcomes are uncertain. The initial premise of this paper was that identifying (1) the specific 
sources of variance, and (2) particular solutions requires a multi-theoretical perspective on how a 
temporary organization’s set of agent inputs translates into outcomes.  
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Our framework points to the risk of analyzing temporary organizations through a single 
theoretical lens. Agency theory’s focus on individual contracts downplays the organizational 
qualities that may reside in prior ties and a common organizational context. At the same time, 
overestimating the organizational properties of the larger context may create problems in its own 
right, to the extent that the focal properties may not be fully portable. In general, temporary 
organizations face significant and partly competing demands (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010); some 
of which have to do with simultaneously managing pressures towards both under- and 
overorganizing (Chen 2009).  
Past research, such as Granovetter’s (2005) embeddedness thesis, has made a persuasive 
case for the “interpenetration of economic and social action” and for the need to jointly examine 
formal and informal organizational mechanisms (Cao and Lumineau 2015; Kumar et al. 2011). 
Our framework points to specific inter-relationships between embedded ties and formal agency 
mechanisms. For selection purposes, we argue that the two may complement each other, since 
explicit signals that reveal agent traits may sometimes be needed to augment pre-existing ties. In 
contrast, embedded ties may substitute for formal selection devices (Grugulis and Stoyanova 
2012), but only for familiar tasks where agent traits are portable. Furthermore, embedded ties and 
formal agency mechanisms may substitute for each other as enforcement devices, regardless of 
the novelty of the temporary marketing organization’s task.  
In general, we seek to add precision to the embeddedness argument by suggesting that 
embedded ties possess particular, but to date undocumented, boundary conditions. Below, we 
first identify some implications for managerial decision-making that follow from our framework. 
We close with a discussion of topics for future research. 
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Managerial Implications 
While our current contributions are mainly theoretical, we nonetheless consider some 
broad prescriptions for managerial decision-making. As a starting point, in an era of shrinking 
marketing departments and shortened average tenure of CMOs (Tadena 2016), marketers are 
more inclined to rely on temporary organizations to meet their objectives with immediate impact. 
Some guidance about how best to implement this organizational form is therefore essential. We 
consider the development of guidelines to help firms determine the most appropriate selection 
and enforcement mechanisms depending on the form of temporary marketing organization to be 
the single most important managerial implication deriving from our framework. Using task 
novelty, time pressures, likely team heterogeneity, and temporary organizational form as inputs, 
we suggest building a ‘playbook’ to assist marketers in using temporary organizations to best 
effect.12 
To begin with, firms might audit the extent to which they have access to embedded 
networks of partners to complete the task at hand and meet its objectives. For instance, a simple 
starting point might be to count the number of formal agreements a firm has with external parties 
(e.g., licensing, joint ventures) and the extent to which it tends to engage in single partner 
alliances with multiple contractual agreements. Such assessments are likely to give a rough 
indication of how embedded a firm is within a network (Stuart 1998) and of the availability of 
pre-existing agent relationships. A more analytically rigorous approach would be to capture how 
well an individual, team, or firm is tied to well-connected others in a supplier network (Packard 
                                                 
12 We concede that our ‘playbook’ may risk oversimplifying some of the nuanced interactions between the “Three 
Ts” as determinants of temporary organizational form. For example, some novel tasks may require more 
heterogeneous teams, resulting in a tension between the utility of stand-alone and fully embedded forms. Some 
degree of managerial judgement will be necessary to determine which project feature will dominate the choice of 
temporary organization form. 
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et al. 2016). Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987), for example, measures the extent to which 
an individual, team, or firm has relationships with suppliers who are themselves connected to 
many others – a reflection of the density of the network in which the focal firm is embedded. 
An initial, systematic assessment of task novelty, time allocated to complete the task, and 
the likely composition of the team are equally important to a managerial application of our 
framework. Task novelty might reflect the amount of change expressed, for example, as a 
percentage of new or different elements involved in a task between the last similar task and the 
current one (Griffin 1997). It is an approach similar to Clark and Fujimoto’s (1991) measure of 
project scope as an indexed combination of the number of newly designed elements and the level 
of supplier-controlled input. Experienced managers will have an intuitive sense of a task’s time 
requirement – usually as a result of track record and industry benchmarking. Even so, industry 
research suggests that the majority of new product launches tend to experience delays (Wu et al. 
2004), hinting at a general lack of ability to estimate task duration. This is where more 
sophisticated time tracking software similar to the ones used in the legal industry to estimate and 
track project time might assist. Finally, managers seeking to estimate in advance the optimal 
heterogeneity when assembling a team might borrow from some of the advances in relational 
demography. Salient (potential) team member characteristics might be used to calculate a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman coefficient (Blau 1977) which generates a single index of team diversity. 
Taken together, these diagnostics of embeddedness and task novelty, duration, and team 
heterogeneity can guide the design of temporary marketing organizations with the explicit goal of 
ensuring matches that promote sought-after marketing outcomes, including output creativity and 
decision-making speed. 
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Directions for Future Research 
We identify four broad avenues for future research, namely, (1) different forms of 
temporary organizations, (2) structural embeddedness, (3) multi-level relationships, and (4) 
micro-level properties and processes. 
Forms of temporary organizations. A first area of future research focuses on identifying 
more fine-grained temporary organization forms. Our framework treated hybrid and fully 
embedded temporary organizations as separate categories, and we highlighted characteristics that 
are uniquely associated with each one (e.g., dyadic versus organization-level norms). Thus, in the 
discussion leading to Proposition 6, we focused on the unique incremental properties of a fully 
embedded temporary organization. We acknowledge, however, the possibility of overlap between 
categories, in that hybrids may take place within permanent organizations, and that the same 
individuals may interact with each other, either on different hybrids or on different temporary 
organizations within a given firm. This raises interesting theoretical questions regarding the 
relationships between different organizational mechanisms and whether they support or 
undermine each-other; and regarding whether the unique characteristics of a permanent 
organization support or undermine the particular properties of a hybrid.  
Regarding the former, while the embedded ties that underlie a hybrid are widely regarded 
as having self-enforcing properties (Krippner and Alvarez 2007), the lack of a foreseeable future 
may represent a source of strain. As such, hybrids that are implemented within permanent 
organizations that possess a “shadow of the future” are uniquely positioned to both develop and 
maintain strong dyadic norms. For instance, such benefits may accrue to research organizations 
working under the aegis of the same pharmaceutical company or components suppliers working 
on upgrades to the next generation of high-technology products. Further, common ownership 
may in some instances serve as an important buffer. As noted, certain agency initiatives (e.g., 
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monitoring) may in themselves be associated with negative consequences (e.g., agent reactance). 
However, to the extent that the larger organizational context legitimizes such practices, this risk 
may be mitigated (Williamson 1975).  
There may also be inherent incompatibilities between the properties of a temporary 
organization and its larger context. For instance, temporary organizations frequently develop 
unique norms distinct from those of permanent organizations, and in some instances may even be 
purposely protected from the effects of a larger permanent organization (O'Connor and 
DeMartino 2006). Hence, the specific nature of the influence from a temporary marketing 
organization’s larger context is not clear-cut. As a consequence, some firms choose to co-locate 
temporary organizations with the focal permanent firm while others intentionally put distance 
between them. For example, Walmart Labs works side-by-side with the Walmart Global 
eCommerce team to ensure seamless implementation of new ideas. By contrast, other firms 
intentionally set up “innovation outposts” located in distant technology clusters to enable 
involvement “in the tech community, without committing significant investment” (Solis et al. 
2015, p. 6). A full-fledged theory of temporary organizations will require a more comprehensive 
specification of how organization-level mechanisms interact with particular aspects of a 
temporary organization’s larger context to influence performance. It will also require a more fine-
grained analysis of temporary organization forms. 
Structural Embeddedness. A second avenue for future research pertains to the interactions 
between a temporary organization’s practices and its larger industry context. While our primary 
focus was on relational embeddedness between a principal and an agent, structural embeddedness 
– that is, “connections among mutual contacts” (Jones and Lichtenstein 2008; Wuyts and Van 
den Bulte 2012) – raises interesting questions. For instance, agents’ industry reputations may 
serve (indirect) selection purposes in a network. On the face of it, the dense networks within 
35 
 
which many temporary organizations operate may lend themselves well to reputation effects 
(Bechky 2006; Grabher 2004). At the same time, the inherent difficulty of monitoring individual 
agent effort undermines the disciplinary role of reputations. Conceivably, reputation effects 
associated with a temporary organization may be more strongly tied to relational than bespoke 
temporary organizational attributes. Future research could be directed towards (1) the key aspects 
of reputations in the context of temporary organizations, and (2) the extent to which the relevant 
attributes serve selection and enforcement purposes.  
Multi-Level Relationships. Future research can usefully be directed towards exploring 
more complex relationships that may not readily fit the standard principal-agent model, or that 
may span multiple levels, involving upstream suppliers, producers, and even downstream 
customers. Consider first the former. Noticeably, some temporary organizations lack clear 
hierarchical structures and an independent authority to make decisions and enforce compliance. 
For instance, Sapsed and Salter (2004) note that the absence of a single executive owner 
(principal) of a global computing project led to lapses in problem-solving. Similarly, large 
government marketing projects often have multiple principals, including Congressional and 
White House committees, specific government offices, and executive departmental units (Moe 
1987). This was apparent with the significant cost overruns that accompanied the development of 
the Healthcare.gov website – the portal through which U.S. citizens could compare health 
insurance plans under the 2010 Affordable Care Act. The coders brought in to save the product 
development process found themselves continually stifled by “tiers of people” across multiple 
government entities who, as one coder put it, were “managing developers at a distance” (Meyer 
2015, p. 6). Even in such temporary organizations, the agency problems of hidden information 
and hidden action, and thus the organizational challenges of selection and enforcement, still 
prevail (Eggers and O'Leary 2009; Sapsed and Salter 2004). Differences exist, however, in the 
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ways in which processes such as enforcement are carried out: although monitoring is a generic 
phenomenon, the nature of the monitoring process in temporary organizations with unclear 
hierarchical structures differs and calls for further enquiry.  
Furthermore, a temporary organization may establish social or “communal” exchanges 
(Clark and Mils 1993) with downstream customers. For instance, for certain movies, entire 
“brand communities” (Muniz and O’Guinn 2001) have emerged. In Becker’s (1982) terminology, 
customers become permanent members of certain “art worlds”, and come to identify with the 
temporary organization itself. Similarly, social ties between the relevant parties in the IT industry 
blur the traditional boundaries between principals and agents (Kirsch et al. 2010). Managers of 
temporary marketing organization have started to exploit these relationships, for instance by 
incorporating customers’ suggestions early in their product development efforts (Huston and 
Sakkab 2006) and by hiring them as agents. By doing so, they may be in a position to resolve 
both selection and enforcement problems.  
Micro-level properties and processes. Another research avenue pertains to the micro-level 
structural characteristics of temporary organizations. For instance, in a similar fashion to 
permanent organizations, characteristics like size (Katz and Kahn 1978) may create 
organizational challenges which have selection and enforcement implications. Further, power and 
politics in temporary organizations provide a promising avenue of research. Kaplan and 
Orlikowski (2013) uncover the inherently political nature of temporary organizing, and 
McGivern et al. (2017) build on Granqvist and Gustafsson (2016) to demonstrate how the politics 
involving actors with different temporal orientations manifest themselves.  
In general, we hope that our perspective on temporary marketing organizations will 
motivate further conceptual and empirical inquiry. We also hope that it will assist marketing 
managers in making informed choices on temporary organizations, and in matching 
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organizational forms and task, time and team drivers. While the merging of economic and 
sociological perspectives that underlies our framework  is “messy” (Kreps 1997), its payoffs may 
be considerable and add to our understanding of temporary marketing organizations. 
(Engwall and Svensson 2004) (Kogut 1988) (Brouthers and Brouthers 2000; Carter et al. 1996; 
Cyert and March 1963; Hennart 1988; March and Simon 1958) 
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TABLE 1 
Organizational Forms 
 
 
Stand-Alone Temporary 
Organization
Joint Venture Start-up Permanent Organization
Time
P
a
s
t
Absent
• No history of ties between 
organizational members; only 
industry level reputations 
available
Possible
• History of working 
relationship determines joint 
venture partner
Absent
• Typically, no history of ties 
between members
Existing
• Existing members managed 
within employment 
relationship
F
u
tu
re
Absent
• Termination implied with task 
completion
Possible
• Formed with multiple projects 
in mind
Intended
• Organizational longevity and 
growth are assumed
Existing
• Organizational longevity is 
assumed
Indicative 
literature
Lundin and Söderholm (1995), 
Engwall and Svensson (2004)
Kogut (1988), Hennart (1988), 
Gulati (1998)
Carter, Gartner, and Reynolds 
(1996), Brouthers and Brouthers
(2000)
Williamson (1975), Cyert and 
March (1963), March and Simon 
(1958) 
Example
An organization that exists solely 
to address a specific issue (i.e., 
create a new product or service), 
and is disbanded after the 
completion of the task (e.g., app 
developers for Healthcare.gov).
An organization created by two or 
more parties, characterized by 
shared ownership, to combine 
capabilities to address one or 
more issues of joint interest. May 
dissolve (e.g., Lion and 
Heineken) or may become 
permanent (e.g., Dow Corning)
A newly created organization 
designed to exploit a market 
opportunity, with a minimum 
viable product, service, or 
platform and a scalable business 
model (e.g., WeWork, Square, 
Uptake)
A limited liability organization with 
(often public) established 
ownership arrangements and 
stable governance structures 
(e.g., independent board and 
management team) and ongoing 
employment relations (e.g., IBM, 
DuPont, Procter & Gamble)
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TABLE 2 
Temporary Organization Forms 
 
 
  
Past Temporary Organization Forms Future
No shared history
• Lack of information on member 
attributes
• Need for explicit selection
Stand-alone
(e.g., a radical innovation project, a one-
off product launch event)
No shadow of the future
• No inherent incentive for member 
cooperation
• Need for explicit enforcement of 
member effort to complete task
Direct history
• Direct observation and personal 
reputation
• Dyadic norms
Hybrid
(e.g., feature film production, marketing 
communications campaigns)
Uncertain future
• Weak incentives for member 
cooperation
• Need for explicit enforcement of 
member effort to complete task
Shared organizational history
• Organization-level reputation
• Organization-level norms
Fully embedded
(e.g., internal consulting unit, new 
product development team)
Shadow of the future
• Open-ended interaction of members
Explicit enforcement mechanisms
• Low-powered incentives
• Centralized monitoring of members
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework 
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